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In this programmatic paper we explain why a radical embodied cognitive neuroscience
is needed. We argue for such a claim based on problems that have arisen in cognitive
neuroscience for the project of localizing function to specific brain structures. The
problems come from research concerned with functional and structural connectivity
that strongly suggests that the function a brain region serves is dynamic, and changes
over time. We argue that in order to determine the function of a specific brain area,
neuroscientists need to zoom out and look at the larger organism-environment system.
We therefore argue that instead of looking to cognitive psychology for an analysis of
psychological functions, cognitive neuroscience should look to an ecological dynamical
psychology. A second aim of our paper is to develop an account of embodied cognition
based on the inseparability of cognitive and emotional processing in the brain. We argue
that emotions are best understood in terms of action readiness (Frijda, 1986, 2007) in the
context of the organism’s ongoing skillful engagement with the environment (Rietveld,
2008; Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014; Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2015, forthcoming).
States of action readiness involve the whole living body of the organism, and are elicited
by possibilities for action in the environment that matter to the organism. Since emotion
and cognition are inseparable processes in the brain it follows that what is true of
emotion is also true of cognition. Cognitive processes are likewise processes taking
place in the whole living body of an organism as it engages with relevant possibilities for
action.
Keywords: emotion cognition interactions, psychological constructionism, salience network, embodied cognition,
affordances, dynamical systems theory
Introduction
Radical embodied cognitive science is a relatively new branch of cognitive science that looks to
ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory to understand the contribution of bodily
capacities to cognitive processes (Chemero, 2009; Barrett, 2011). It is ‘‘radical’’ in claiming that
cognitive scientists need new conceptual tools if they are to understand the ways in which cognition
depends on the body in its interaction with the environment. The classical conception of the
human mind as working according to the same principles as a digital computer encourages us
to think of the body and the environment as providing at best inputs to, and receiving outputs
from cognitive processes (Rupert, 2009). Embodied approaches to cognitive science by contrast
stress the many and varied ways in which an animal’s environmental niche offers resources for
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the animal to act on. The individual has bodily skills and abilities
that are refined and perfected through practice for dealing
adequately with the possibilities for action the environment
offers. The explanatory tools cognitive science deploys must
do justice to the essential contributions of bodily skills and
environmental affordances to cognitive behavior. They must
account for the ways in which the individual is able to
expertly coordinate their behavior with a dynamically changing
environment. Ecological psychology and dynamical systems
theory provide the tools to meet this challenge. Moreover the
conceptual tools these sciences offer are arguably better suited
to explaining the complex, dynamical interactions between an
animal and its environment than the standard computational
tools of cognitive science. This gives us a pragmatic reason to
add these explanatory frameworks to the explanatory toolkit of
cognitive science.
Our aim in this paper will be to argue that cognitive
neuroscience should look to ecological dynamical psychology
for an understanding of the psychological functions the brain
performs. The classical approach to cognitive science encourages
the following view of the division of labor between psychology
and neuroscience. Cognitive psychology provides analyses of
the cognitive operations an individual must perform in order
to carry out a cognitive task. Cognitive neuroscience then
seeks to determine how these cognitive operations are carried
out by brain regions and networks of brain regions. Consider
vision as an example. The tasks the visual system performs
are commonly decomposed and broken down into early visual
processing in which an image is formed, and features of
the surfaces in the surrounding environment are represented.
At an intermediate stage in visual processing features of
surfaces are used to construct object representations. Late
processes then use object-based information to put objects into
categories (Palmer and Kimchi, 1986). Cognitive neuroscientists
design their experiments based on this type of functional
decomposition of visual processing in the brain. The aim of
their experiments is to use the knowledge we have accumulated
from previous experiments to determine how these different
stages in visual processing are carried out by the brain. There
is no room in this view of the division of labor between
psychology and neuroscience for the body and the environment
to play anything other than a peripheral role in cognitive
processes.
A radical embodied cognitive neuroscience will take
its analyses of psychological function not from cognitive
psychology, but instead from ecological psychology and
dynamical systems theory. The advantage of doing so will be
an analysis of psychological function that does justice to the
contribution of the bodily capacities and the ecological setting to
a given cognitive behavior.
The first part of our paper will point to findings that strongly
suggest it is time for cognitive neuroscientists to look elsewhere
for their analyses of psychological function than to classical
cognitive psychology. We begin by reviewing recent research
concerned with large-scale patterns of connectivity in the brain.
We take this research to present a major challenge to any
analysis of the brain into functionally specialized regions that
carry out either emotional or cognitive psychological functions.
Such a view of the brain as being made up of functionally
specialized regions follows naturally from the view of the division
of labor between psychology and neuroscience we sketched
above. Cognitive psychology has the job of providing analyses
of the functions that are computed in emotional and cognitive
processing. Cognitive neuroscience looks to determine how these
functions are performed by different regions and networks in
the brain (see e.g., Posner et al., 1988). The work we will
review on functional and structural connectivity in the brains of
humans and other animals supports a different perspective on
brain processes in which classical emotional and cognitive brain
regions are in constant dynamic interaction. We will show how
this work on functional connectivity makes trouble for attempts
at localizing either emotional or cognitive functions to specific
brain structures.
We argue next that psychological function is better
understood at the level of the whole brain-body-environment
system. The argument we offer for this second thesis is
somewhat circuitous, but necessarily so because it enables
us to engage with, and distinguish our proposal from other
related theories in the literature on emotion and cognition. We
begin by comparing our perspective with that of psychological
constructionist (or dimensional) theories of emotion which
interpret the integration of cognitive and emotional processes in
terms of interactions between domain general neural networks
(see e.g., Barrett and Satpute, 2013). We suggest (following
arguments developed in Pessoa, 2014) that structure-function
mappings are not fixed and static properties of networks.
Instead structure-function relationships are dynamic, with
the functions a given network performs varying over time
in a highly flexible and context-dependent manner. We
then argue that the functional contribution of a network is
determined by the whole organism in its interaction with
an environment that is rich with possibilities for actions. To
determine the precise functional contribution of a network
to an animal’s behavior we must look at how this network
functions in the context of a wider organism-environment
system.
The radical rejection of the classical computationalist
explanatory framework by advocates of an embodied approach
to cognitive science has been taken to call into question
the place of the concept of representation in psychological
explanation. Hutto and Myin have argued for instance that
the dynamic engagement of an animal with the environment
doesn’t require the extraction, processing and manipulation
of states with semantic or representational content (Hutto
and Myin, 2013). We do not engage directly with this
issue, but instead focus our arguments on defending the
claim that embodied cognition is best studied at the level
of the whole brain-body-environment system. We leave the
implications of our arguments for the role of representation in
psychological explanation as a matter to be discussed on another
occasion.
The positive view we develop in this paper will be built
up in two stages. First, we argue that cognition and emotion
are inseparable processes in the brain. Second, we argue
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emotion is a dynamic process involving the whole body of
the organism. The first two steps in our argument establish
the inseparability of emotion and cognition in the brain and
the deep dependence of emotional processes on the whole
body of the living organism in its practical skilled engagement
with the environment. We take these two steps to imply a
third step: the conclusion that cognitive processes depend on
the whole living body of a person or animal in its practical
and skilled engagement with an environment of affordances.
Since emotion deeply depends on the living body, so also does
cognition.
Localizing Emotion and Cognition in the
Brain
When we ordinarily think of emotion we often think of
short-lived, transient episodes that wash over, and sometimes
overwhelm us, gradually fading away after a relatively short
period of time. Folk psychology makes distinctions between
episodes of anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and so on.
When we think of our own emotions and those of others we
do so using these folk psychological categories. How do these
folk psychological emotion categories map onto processes in
the brain?
Affective neuroscientists have posited a set of biologically
basic emotions such as rage, fear, lust, care, and grief that
can be localized to specific and dedicated networks in the
human brain (Panksepp, 1998, 2012). Typically these basic
emotions are associated with the brain stem, the diencephalon
(thalamus and hypothalamus), and limbic structures which are
taken to be evolutionarily old, primitive parts of the brain,
highly structured at birth and relatively isolated from learning.
These parts of the brain are directly connected, and tightly
coupled to autonomic, endocrine and immune systems in the
body that work together to keep an organism’s body in a
state of homeostatic and metabolic equilibrium. They are also
taken to be ‘‘automatic’’ in their processing (as contrasted
with cognitively controlled processes), and are thought to be
critically involved in impulsive behavioral responses such as fear
and rage.
Cognitive processes (such as learning and memory, reasoning
and planning) are often associated with the phylogenetically
newer and more highly evolved cerebral cortex. The neocortex
in primates has been described as the ‘‘crowning achievement
of evolution and the biological substrate of the human mental
prowess.’’ (Rakic, 2009, quoted by Barton, 2012, p. 2098). The
primate neocortex for instance shows a fivefold difference in
volume when compared to that found in insectivores (Barton
and Harvey, 2000). This growth is thought by many to be
accompanied by an evolution of higher-cognitive functions.
Systems in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) for instance make use of
information that has been processed by other parts of the brain
to ensure that we, in contrast to our animal ancestors, keep our
emotional impulses in check. As the Victorian neurologist John
Hughlings-Jackson put it: ‘‘the higher nervous arrangements
evolved out of the lower keep down those lower, just as a
government evolved out of a nation controls as well as directs
that nation.’’ (Jackson, 1884, p. 662, quoted by Parvizi, 2009,
p. 354) The frontal lobes exert control over, and suppress our
more animal desires, thereby ensuring that we act in ways that
are contextually appropriate. These functional processes allow
higher mammals to compare possible plans and strategies offline,
andmake a cost-benefit calculation as to which possible course of
action is likely to be the most beneficial in the long run.
This understanding of cognition and emotion leads to a
view of the mammalian brain as divided into cognitive ‘‘higher’’
regions (neocortex) and emotional ‘‘lower’’ subcortical regions.
This division is perhaps best exemplified in Paul MacLean’s
discredited triune model of the mammalian brain (MacLean,
1952, 1990; for criticisms see Swanson, 1983; LeDoux, 2012).
The lower, animal parts of the brain are understood (in line
with the Hughlings-Jackson ‘‘Victorian’’ narrative) as standing
in a linear, and hierarchical relationship to the higher neocortical
regions. Why assume however that the only parts of the human
brain to undergo change over the course of evolution were
those located in the cortex? An alternative co-evolutionary
hypothesis is that both cortex and sub-cortex underwent changes
in a coordinated fashion. Those brain structures with major
anatomical and functional links most likely evolved together
(Barton and Harvey, 2000). Barton (2012) discusses for instance
how the cerebellum (an area known to be involved in the
learning of motor skills) is larger in primates compared with
other mammals. He adduces evidence for the threefold co-
evolution of the diencephalon, cerebellum and the neocortex.
There is also evidence that subregions of the amygdala are
substantially more developed in monkeys as compared with
rats (Chareyon et al., 2011). Pessoa has suggested, in line
with the co-evolutionary hypothesis we just sketched, that
this increase in size in the amygdala is likely to be linked
to the degree of connectivity with other brain structures
(Pessoa, 2014, pp. 413–414).
The old hierarchical model of the higher primate brain
and the lower reptilian brain assumes a unidirectional flow
of information from lower to higher brain systems. While
the higher-brain systems depend on lower-brain systems for
their functioning the reverse is not true. Parvizi (2009) offers
an important critique of this ‘‘corticocentric myopia’’. In his
words ‘‘higher functions of the brain are made possible by
a reciprocal interconnection between cortical and subcortical
structures rather than being localized only in the upper tip of
the vertical neuroaxis’’ (p. 354). Parvizi describes the connectivity
between the cortex and the rest of the brain in terms of
‘‘reciprocal interconnection’’. This means that there are complex
relations of negative and positive feedback that characterize the
communication between sub-cortex and cortex. Parvizi suggests
that higher brain functions (such as executive control functions)
happen in ‘‘the loops operating between the cortical areas and
‘‘lower’’ subcortical structures such as the basal ganglia; the
basal forebrain; the thalamus; the cerebellum; and the brainstem
dopaminergic and noradrenergic systems.’’ (p. 358, supporting
references omitted).
Consider as an example the hypothalamus, a region located
just below the thalamus and above the brain stem. The
hypothalamus is commonly associated with the coordination
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of homeostatic mechanisms such as hormonal and behavioral
circadian rhythms and neuroendocrine processes. However,
it is also bidirectionally connected to the cerebral cortex by
at least four pathways that run via the basal forebrain and
amygdala; the brainstem and the thalamus (Risold et al., 1997).
Barbas and Rempel-Clower (1997) showed that in primates
the hypothalamus projects to all regions (orbital, medial and
lateral) of the PFC. The hypothalamus functions as a so-
called ‘‘connectivity hub’’ that is optimally placed because of
its extensive connections to have a near global effect on brain
function (Pessoa, 2013, pp. 230–231). Importantly, areas of the
PFC (orbital and medial PFC), insular cortex, hippocampus, and
amygdala also link back to the hypothalamus. The connections
between the hypothalamus and PFC are bidirectional and
reciprocal, allowing for rapid coordination and synchronization
of activity between ‘‘higher’’ and ‘‘lower’’ brain systems. This
coordination allows for cognitive and affective processes to be
mobilized together allowing the animal to behave flexibly, and
in ways that are adapted to the particularities of a context of
activity.
This picture of higher cognitive systems and lower emotional
systems as being ‘‘vertically’’ integrated and tightly coordinated
strongly argues against a corticocentric myopia. It suggests
instead a view of cognitive and emotional processes as strongly
interdependent (Lewis, 2005; Stapleton, 2012; Pessoa, 2013;
Colombetti, 2014, ch.4). By ‘‘interdependent’’ we mean to
refer to the degree to which cortical and sub-cortical systems
influence each other. This degree of influence is measured
by the information-processing operations the components
that make up these systems each perform. The evidence
(some of which we have reviewed above) points to a
tight coupling or mutual influence between these systems.
The operations carried out by components located in the
cortex are constantly effecting, and being effected by, the
operations that are taking place in components found in
the sub-cortical systems. Functional connectivity isn’t just
about channeling information between functionally specialized
brain regions. Instead it ‘‘generates complex system-wide
dynamics that enable local regions to participate across a broad
range of cognitive and behavioral tasks’’ (Byrge et al., 2014,
p. 395).
Marc Lewis provides a clear example of the dynamical
interaction between emotion and cognition in the brain (Lewis,
2005). He discusses the cognitive and neural processes that are
engaged when a person experiences ‘‘road rage’’. We quote him
at length because his example makes it clear why it is important
to understand this interaction between emotional and cognitive
processes as taking place at the level of the whole embodied
person in the environment, a point we return to below.
‘‘Mr. Smart slams on the brakes when noticing the proximity
of the car in front. Anger arises initially from frustration, as
Mr. Smart wants to keep driving fast, but also from a sense
of violated entitlement: he is in the left lane and should not
have to slow down. Fear may also be triggered by the close
call, eliciting further anger because of an intermediate evaluation
of unmanly helplessness. These emotions arise rapidly, but they
are paralleled by a co-emerging sense of the other driver as
intentionally obstructive (and therefore blameworthy). Mr. Smart’s
highly focused visual attention, a derivative of anger, takes in the
red color of the car ahead, as well as the expensive-looking design,
and his anger is amplified by his sense of the unfairness of this show-
off blocking his path (based on an implicit memory of some long-
forgotten or fantasized rival). A stabilizing angry-anxious state,
coupled with ruminative plans for vengeance (perhaps a blast of
the horn), anchors attention to the head of the man in front. This
lasts for a minute or two while Mr. Smart fashions and modifies
plans to pass on the right. However, when the man peers over his
shoulder, Mr. Smart evaluates this act as a taunt, generating shame
and anger in an elaborated appraisal of humiliation, and calling
for extreme action to save his self-image from further subjugation’’
(Lewis, 2005, p. 175).
For Lewis a change in emotional state is triggered whenever
orderly behavior ‘‘is interrupted by a perturbation, resulting
in a rapid loss of orderliness and an increase in sensitivity
to the environment’’ (Lewis, 2005, p. 174). In Smart’s case
the suddenly obstructed lane jolts his body from a state of
low arousal (feeling of calmness and flow) to being highly
aroused (feelings of fear and anger). Lewis writes: ‘‘living systems
are like taut springs, ready to respond to small perturbations
that are biologically meaningful’’ (Lewis, 2005, p. 176; see also
Kauffman, 1993). Any cognitive or emotional event can be a
trigger, so long as it sufficiently perturbs the system into a state
of disorder. Once order has been disrupted, sub-cortical and
cortical neural systems enter into a series of recursive feed-
back loops, activity in the one system amplifying activity in the
other (Lewis, 2005, p. 176). Consider for example the positive
feed-back loop established between the psychological processes
of bodily arousal on the one hand (realized in sub-cortical,
limbic systems), and attention and recall (involving regions in
the neocortex) on the other. Smart’s feelings of violation at
being halted in the fast lane triggers feelings of anger. The
arousal generated by the anger motivates and focuses Smart’s
attentional resources onto the dangerous and transgressive
elements in the environment: the driver of the red sports car.
This increased attentional focus highlights the expensiveness of
the automobile, which in turn triggers feelings of unfairness,
which increase Smart’s feelings of anger. Simultaneously Smart’s
angry arousal anchors his recall processes to similar past
situations, and memories of past transgressors, which amplifies
Smart’s feeling of anger. Smart’s bodily arousal motivates and
directs his attentional and recall processes. These cognitive
processes in turn intensify and prolong his state of anger
arousal.
When the somatic and cognitive processes become
appropriately coupled (anger in the form of bodily
arousal directing attention and recall, attention and recall
sustaining/amplifying bodily arousal) the brain systems
supporting these psychological processes begin to settle into
stable patterns of activity (Lewis, 2005, p. 177). Just as a group
of birds quickly settles into an enduring flocking pattern, so
also do Smart’s emotional and cognitive processes temporarily
stabilize and settle into a coherent and large scale anger-anxiety
state. The ‘‘lower’’ neural processes that track bodily arousal,
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and the ‘‘higher’’ neural processes associated with attention
and memory sustain each other, and generate an enduring
emotional-cognitive state.
Lewis’s example is framed in psychological terms, but the
reciprocal and mutual influence he describes strongly speaks
against any separation of emotion and cognition in the brain.
Subcortical and cortical networks non-linearly interact in his
example in such a way as to sustain temporary, large-scale
patterns of organization over time. One might object that
the activity in these networks take shape on the basis of
interaction, or communication between functionally specialized
brain regions. We think this is exactly the picture of the
organization in the brain that is called into question once one
rejects corticocentric myopia. In the Smart example, we see
how negative and positive feedback loops shift the brain from
a state of relative disorder to a temporary, more or less short-
lived pattern of global coherence. This shift from disorder to
global coherence involves the formation of large scale networks
in the brain. The relations of feedback that are critical for the
formation of such networks mean that each element is directly
or indirectly affecting every other element that makes up the
network. This fundamentally challenges a picture in which each
element performs a psychological operation (either emotional
or cognitive) apart from its interactions with other elements.
We suggest instead conceptualizing psychological function at the
level of the processes taking place in the large-scale network
as a whole. Large-scale networks implement psychological
processes that are simultaneously both emotional and cognition
in nature. They are in Lewis’s words ‘‘amalgams’’ of emotion and
cognition.
Are Emotional and Cognitive Processes
“Psychological Constructs”?
We have now given the argument for the first claim we
wish to make in this paper that the brains of animals resist
functional decomposition into separable emotional and cognitive
components. In this section we begin making the case for
the second step in our argument, which is a defense of the
claim that the amalgam of emotional and cognitive processes
we find in the brain deeply depend upon the whole living
body of an organism. We begin by discussing psychological
constructionism because research in this tradition would seem,
at least at first glance, to lend further support for the view
we have been developing. Psychological constructionism grew
out of the dimensional theory of emotion. The dimensional
theory claims that emotional episodes such as fear, anger, and
sadness are combinations of more fundamental dimensions
such as arousal (the strength and intensity of an emotion)
and valence (the degree of pleasantness or unpleasantness)
working in combination with cognitive processes of appraisal
The dimensional theory can be traced back to Wundt and has
received more recent defense in the work of James Russell and
Lisa Feldman-Barrett (Wundt, 1897; Russell, 1980, 2003; Barrett,
2006). More recently, psychological constructionists have begun
to argue that emotions do not map onto distinct regions and
networks in the brain but are instead the result of dynamic
interactions between large-scale networks that compute domain-
general functions (Barrett and Satpute, 2013). This looks to be
very much in keeping with what was argued in the previous
section.
The constructionist theory is often contrasted with categorical
or discrete theories of emotion (briefly discussed at the
beginning of section Introduction). Discrete theories of emotion
posit basic emotions (e.g., anger, fear, sadness, happiness,
disgust and surprise) that are species-universal, hardwired,
and have unique physiological and neural signatures or
profiles (see e.g., Panksepp, 1998; Ekman, 1999; Izard, 2007,
2011). Discrete theories of emotion have unfortunately often
subscribed to the problematic division of the brain into
emotional and cognitive systems criticized in the previous
section (see e.g., Panksepp, 1998). Constructionists add
something important to our earlier argument by calling
into question the claim that emotions can be mapped onto
specific functionally-specialized regions and networks in
the brain. They argue instead that the brain is organized
into domain-general, distributed functional networks,
and emotions are the result of interactions between these
networks.
A growing literature supports a view of function-structure
mappings in the brain as many-to-many, thereby bolstering the
case for a constructionist theory of emotion. There can be no
one-to-one mapping of psychological function to anatomical
regions or structures because brain regions and structures exhibit
extensive pluripotency and degeneracy. Pluripotency refers to
the well-established finding that one and the same region (e.g.,
Broca’s area) can be involved in the performance of multiple
functions e.g., language processing, movement preparation,
imitation and imagery related tasks (see Anderson, 2010, 2014
for discussion of this and many other examples of pluripotency).
Degeneracy refers to the finding that different neural structures
can perform one and the same function (Edelman and Gally,
2001; Friston and Price, 2003; Figdor, 2010). Taken together
these findings suggest a many-to-many mapping of structure to
function at the level of brain regions.
This seems to present a challenge to the discrete theory
of emotion. Pluripotency and degeneracy strongly suggest that
each basic emotion is unlikely to have its own physiological
and neural profile. Consider what we now know about the
amygdala in this regard, an area that is often referred to as
supporting a discrete theory of fear because it has repeatedly
been shown to be involved in threat responses in rats and
humans (see e.g., LeDoux, 1996; Öhman and Mineka, 2001;
for critical discussion see Sander et al., 2003). The amygdala
has however also been shown to be active when people
are presented with novel, but emotionally neutral stimuli
(Moriguchi et al., 2011; Balderston et al., 2011; Blackford
et al., 2011). Herry and colleagues for example found increased
activity in the amygdala when subjects were presented with
unpredictable sequences of tones as compared with predictable
sequences (Herry et al., 2007). The amygdala is involved in
a wide variety of different functions, including ‘‘cognitive’’
functions such as value representation and decision-making
(Sergerie et al., 2008; Pessoa, 2013, ch.2).
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Recent meta-analyses have shown that other brain regions
associated with emotion such as the anterior insula, pregenual
and subgenual anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortex also
show increases in activity for a variety of different emotion
states. Lindquist and colleagues compared the sets of brain
regions that were consistently activated in studies of anger,
disgust, fear, happiness and sadness. They found six distributed
networks that consistently showed up in the studies they analyzed
from 1990–2007. The networks and the regions of which they
were composed were not associated with particular emotion
categories, but were instead found to be active in all studies
of emotion experience they analyzed. They found no brain
regions that were functionally specialized—every region that
was activated for one emotion category was also activated for
at least one other emotion category (see Figure 5 in Lindquist
et al., 2012 for a useful visual summary of the findings of
their meta-analyses). The same brain regions can carry out
a variety of distinct psychological operations and belong to
different overlapping networks over time (also see Anderson,
2010, 2014; Colombo, 2013). What a brain region does at
any given time will depend on the network with which it is
affiliated.
Lindquist and colleagues argue their meta-analysis supports
a constructionist or dimensional theory of emotions, and
challenges discrete theories (which they label ‘‘natural kind’’
theories). Emotion in general has as one of its components
bodily arousal which can (but need not) be combined with
pleasurable or unpleasant feelings.Wewill henceforth refer to the
latter dimension of emotion as ‘‘valence’’. Constructionists give
this combination of arousal and valence the label ‘‘core affect’’.
Core affect plays a role in homeostasis tracking endocrinal,
visceral and muscular changes internal to the body that inform
the organism that there is something in the environment of
potential relevance or value. Barrett and Satpute (2013) take
core affect to be neurally realized by a large-scale intrinsic
network that has come to be called the ‘‘salience’’ or ‘‘ventral
attention’’ network (Menon and Uddin, 2010). An intrinsic
network is a network of widely distributed brain regions whose
activations are tightly correlated across time when subjects are
at rest, and their attention is not engaged by any external
task or stimulus (Seeley et al., 2007; Bressler and Menon,
2010; Raichle, 2010; Yeo et al., 2011). Barrett and Satpute
suggest that the salience network is made up of dorsal and
ventral subnetworks. The dorsal subnetwork uses homeostatic
and metabolic information from the body to guide attention
and motor behavior. The ventral subnetwork realizes affective
feelings that are experienced by a subject as pleasurable or
unpleasant with different degrees of arousal. The salience
network carries out ‘‘domain-general’’ functions, which is to
say that this network of brain regions is active in a wide
range of tasks (i.e., it is not domain or function-specific).
What these tasks all share in common is they all require the
orienting of attention to homeostatic or metabolically relevant
information.
Core affect doesn’t provide the basis for making folk
psychological distinctions between emotions. It is a feature
common to all of the emotions we ordinarily distinguish between
in folk psychology. Core affect takes on the character of different
emotions only through the interaction of the salience network
with other domain general networks in which such functions as
categorization, language processing and executive control takes
place. We focus on the role of categorization here since it will
prove important for the argument wemake for an embodied view
of psychological function in the next section of the paper. It also
provides an opportunity for us to briefly compare our theory with
related work on the embodiment of emotion.
Constructionists argue that it is on the basis of the
categorization of core affect that states of bodily arousal are made
meaningful and related to a determinate object. Using the meta-
analytic studies mentioned above as evidence they have recently
argued that categorization takes place in the episodic memory, or
default mode network (DMN) of brain regions that reconstructs
past experiences for use in current processing (Bar, 2007;Wilson-
Mendenhall et al., 2011; Lindquist and Barrett, 2012; Lindquist
et al., 2012). Areas of the default-mode network (medial PFC,
posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus, medial temporal lobe)
were found to be consistently active during a range of emotional
states (Kober et al., 2008; Lindquist et al., 2012). Constructionists
have proposed the hypothesis that the DMN may function
to model probabilistically the causes of current core affective
changes (Lindquist et al., 2012, p. 125). The result of such models
of the causes of core affect is the categorization of core affect as
an instance of anger, fear, sadness or whatever (see also Barrett
and Bar, 2009).
As already noted, this hypothesis certainly makes a good
fit with the findings we reviewed in the previous section of
extensive connectivity between emotional and cognitive brain
regions. Emotion is the outcome of interaction between multiple
psychological components, each associated with assemblies of
neurons within distributed networks. Lindquist and colleagues
write that ‘‘these networks combine and constrain one another
like ingredients in a recipe, influencing and shaping one another
in real time according to the principles of constraint satisfaction’’
(p.126). However, we shall argue that even this picture of
function-to-structure mapping may need to be revised in the
light of the arguments we made above in section one.
Constructionists subscribe to a mechanistic view of
psychological functions whereby emotion is decomposable into
basic psychological operations which can then be mapped onto
distinguishable networks or ‘‘flexible assemblies of neurons’’
that ‘‘fire together in a probabilistic way’’ (Lindquist and Barrett,
2012). We suggest however that functional connectivity may
make trouble for such a functional decomposition, just as it
did for attempts at localizing emotional or cognitive functions
to specific components. We saw in the Smart example how
large-scale networks form in the brain through positive and
negative feedback. This means that either directly through
local anatomical connections, or indirectly through long-
range connections, every brain region has the potential to
influence every other brain region within a given network.
The function and operations a particular region carries out
will be determined by (but also determine) its interactions
with the other elements to which it is connected in a
network.
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In this section, we’ve seen how the same region can play
a role in carrying out very different functions over time. In
order to determine what function a given region is performing
we need to look at the network with which it is affiliated, but
this is something that varies over time. Pessoa has suggested
that ‘‘In the extreme, two networks may involve the exact
same regions interacting with each other in distinct ways across
time’’ (Pessoa, 2014, p. 408). The function of a region is thus
not a fixed and static property, but is dynamic and context-
dependent, varying with the network in which the region is
functioning. A version of the problems we have raised with
localizing function to structure may therefore also arise at
the organizational level of networks. The finding that there
is no one-to-one mapping of structure to function might
also generalize to the domain-general networks appealed to
by psychological constructionists to explain emotion in the
brain. The function of a given intrinsic network may also
be dynamic, with very different networks making the same
functional contribution to behavior at different times (Pessoa,
2014; Fazelpour and Thompson, 2015). The same network of
brain regions may contribute differently to behavior because
of the way in which the elements of which it is composed are
interacting.
The structure-function relation for networks, and not only
for brain regions is thus also in dynamic flux. Pessoa has
suggested that in order to determine the precise functional
contribution of a given network we may need to look at
‘‘global variables’’ such as neurotransmitters, bodily arousal,
and slow-wave potentials (2014, p. 408). The function a given
network performs is dependent upon the wider context in
which the network is active. How should we think about
this context-dependence? We shall argue the context we need
to take into account may include the rest of the body
in its interactions with the environment, as is argued in
radical embodied cognitive science. The mechanistic style of
explanation that constructionists employ assumes however
that networks have fixed domain-general functions. We saw
this for instance in the constructionist proposal to divide
the salience network into ventral and dorsal subnetworks
with ventral regions directing the selection of visceromotor
responses, and the dorsal parts being assigned the function
of spatial orientation and motor selection. The research
we have reviewed on functional connectivity challenges any
such view of structure-functions mappings as fixed and
permanent.
Is this simply a complication in the mechanistic theory of
emotion that constructionists propose, or does it constitute a
more serious challenge? In the next section we suggest it may
be interpreted as supporting an embodied interpretation of the
results reviewed above. Once we start to admit the role of
global variables such as activity in neurotransmitter systems and
valenced states of bodily arousal in influencing the functioning
of a given network, why think of the boundary between the brain
and the rest of the body as a sort of ‘‘magical membrane’’ (Hurley,
2010)? Why think that the factors that influence the function of
a network reside only inside of the brain? In the next section we
argue that bodily states of arousal and valence (which manifest as
changes in the body’s vascular, visceral and motor systems) shift
the brain from state of relative disorder to temporary patterns of
large scale coherence. The environment elicits patterns of action
readiness that manifest in the body in the form of states of arousal
and valence. We take these two points to establish the main claim
of our paper that to understand the psychological function of a
large scale network requires neuroscientists to pay attention to
the whole organism-environment system.
The Deep Dependence of Emotion and
Cognition on the Living Body
The constructionist, dimensional theory of emotion we discussed
in the previous section conceives of emotional experience as
the product of the interaction between different components.
We’ve discussed the core affect and situated conceptualization
networks above. Bodily arousal and valence (core affect) both
occur as part of the life-regulation, homeostatic and metabolic
processes of an organism, a being that strives to resist disorder
and disintegration in its interactions with the environment
(Spinoza, 1677/1894, Ethics III, 6 and 7; Thompson, 2007, part 2;
Colombetti, 2014). We follow Giovanna Colombetti in arguing
that these states of the living body provide an organism with a
means of evaluating and appraising aspects of its surrounding
environment in terms of their relevance or significance for the
organism (Colombetti, 2014). ‘‘Relevance’’ is determined by the
organism in relation to what the phenomenological philosopher
Merleau-Ponty described as the ‘‘organism’s proper manner of
realizing equilibrium’’ with the environment (Merleau-Ponty,
1942/1963, p. 154, also see Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014). When
Merleau-Ponty writes of the organism ‘‘realizing’’ equilibrium
with the environment, we take him to be referring to situations in
which the organism is coping ‘‘smoothly’’ with the environment
(to borrow a phrase fromDreyfus, 1991). Crucially, the organism
never fully accomplishes equilibrium with the environment so
long as it is alive. There is always room for further improvement.
As long as the organism has needs and desires it will always be in
a state of a state of relative disequilibrium with the environment,
a metastable state (Kelso, 2012; Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014).
Living systems act so as to reduce this disequilibrium thereby
improving their situation, and taking them closer towards a state
of equilibrium with the environment.
One of the core components of bodily affect is what the
psychologist Nico Frijda called ‘‘action readiness’’ (Frijda, 1986,
2007). Affect makes the organism ready to act in ways that
improve its grip on the situation in which it finds itself (Rietveld,
2008; Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014; Kiverstein and Rietveld,
2015, forthcoming). The states of bodily arousal that are either
negatively or positively valenced we take to be patterns of bodily
action readiness. Constructionists also take core affect to be the
‘‘body’s way of representing whether objects in the environment
are valuable or not in a given context’’ (Lindquist et al., 2012,
p. 124). The core affect network is described as orienting the
‘‘brain’s processing capacity towards the most homeostatically-
relevant and metabolically-relevant information—it performs a
body-based source of attention within the human brain’’ (Barrett
and Satpute, 2013, p. 366). This is all very much in keeping with
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the view we have just outlined, but with a number of crucial
differences. We argue that this orientation to what is relevant
in the environment should be conceived of as action readiness,
where the latter needs to be understood in the context of a whole
animal-environment system.
The living organism always finds itself in an environment
offering many possibilities for actions. From these possibilities
some are singled out as important to the organism because they
are possibilities that elicit an action-readiness in the organism.
The organism is drawn to act on those affordances that bring the
organism closer to equilibrium with the environment, and move
the organism further away from a state of disequilibrium. We
are suggesting that interoceptive areas of the brain track changes
in patterns of action readiness in the body of the organism as
a whole. These bodily changes reflect the organism’s state of
relative equilibrium with the environment. When the body of
the organism is aroused by some opportunity or challenge in the
environment, the effect on the large-scale patterns of activity in
the brain is that of destabilizing and disrupting the self-sustaining
pattern of organization that has temporarily taken form. In the
terminology of dynamical systems theory, the brain is caused to
shift out of one attractor state. The brain then settles into new
large scale patterns of activity (a new attractor state) that makes
the organism ready to act in ways that reduce its disequilibrium
with the environment.
In our view, bodily arousal in the form of action
readiness already includes some appraisal or evaluation of
the environment. The body of the organism is aroused in
particular way by opportunities or challenges the environment
offers that matter to the organism. Due to the organism’s skills
and abilities that have been trained up in the past, the organism
is already prepared to do what needs to be done to improve its
situation in the world. Constructionists by contrast conceive of
core affect not as states of action readiness, but more along the
lines of raw sensations that are only given meaning through the
cognitive process of situated conceptualization. Lindquist and
colleagues describe categorization as functioning like a ‘‘chisel,
leading people to attend to certain features in a sensory array
and to ignore certain others.’’ Categorization is said to take
place in a network of brain regions (the DMN) that are engaged
when remembering personal experiences (episodic memory)
and when imagining future events (prospection) (Bar, 2007;
Buckner et al., 2008). Categorization is hypothesized to take the
form of representation of prior experiences (Barsalou, 2003).
These prior experiences are used to infer what the most likely
cause of the current affective changes in one’s body might be,
and it is this inference that allows for the integration of internal
changes in bodily experience, and external sensory perception
into a ‘‘meaningful psychological moment’’ (Lindquist et al.,
2012, p. 124).
Constructionists might seem to be making common cause
with recent embodied theorists of emotion such as Paula
Niedenthal who take perceiving and thinking about emotion to
involve the perceptual, somatovisceral and motoric reenactment
or embodiment of the emotion in oneself. Like constructionists,
Niedenthal also takes the concepts involved in thinking about
emotion to be modal concepts involving a re-experiencing of
past experiences. Consider for instance smiling. There is a clear
difference between a felt smile and a false smile, a difference
it turns out that can be traced to ways in which the muscles
around the eye (the orbicularis oculi) contract (Ekman and
Friesen, 1982). This so-called Duchenne marker is found in felt,
but not in false smiles, and is apparently precisely localizable
in the brain (Ekman et al., 1990, though one might question
this in the light of the arguments given above). Niedenthal and
colleagues have argued that the processes involved in recognizing
a false from a felt smile in other people might likewise involve
one unconsciously simulating offline the very same muscle
movements onemakes when genuinely or non-genuinely smiling
(Niedenthal et al., 2010). Emotion is thus embodied because
experiencing emotion, thinking about emotion, and recognizing
emotion in others all require one to literally embody the
emotion oneself in one’s posture, expression, movements and
gestures.
This is an intriguing idea, and the evidence for it is strong.
However, there are a number of important differences between
Niedenthal’s embodied theory of emotion, constructionism,
and our embodied theory. For Niedenthal, folk psychological
distinctions between emotions can be precisely mapped onto
physiological states which can in turn be correlated with
populations of neurons found in sensory, motor and affective
regions of the brain (Niedenthal, 2007). She is careful to add that
the re-experiencing of physiological states involved in perceiving
and thinking about emotion (be it one’s own or other peoples)
need not be real physiological states of the body. Simulations of
these physiological changes will do. The changes taking place in
the living body of the organism turn out to be merely peripheral,
and all the real action required for generating an embodied
emotion takes place in the brain. We argue by contrast that states
of the whole living body in the form of action-readiness drive the
meta-stable, large-scale pattern of activations that take shape in
the brain. Emotion is embodied because it is realized in states of
action readiness that mobilize the organism, orienting the body
to relevant possibilities and challenges.
Constructionists would, we suspect, also disagree with
Niedenthal’s embodied theory. She seems to be committed
to a discrete theory of emotion according to which distinct
physiological and neural states are associated with different
basic emotions. Russell (2003) and Barrett (2006) have both
argued against a mapping of emotions one-to-one onto
behavioral expressions of the kind appealed to in Niedenthal’s
research. They argue for instance that behavioral expressions
of emotion are enormously context-sensitive and exhibit
massive situational variance. For example, in some situations
I may express my sadness by crying, while in many other
situations I may find this sort of open expression of feeling
to be inappropriate. We agree with Colombetti (2014), ch.2
however that a dynamical account of emotions of the type we
have been proposing, can account for this context-sensitivity
without completely rejecting a discrete theory of emotion.
Colombetti argues (and we agree) that emotional episodes may
be mapped onto ‘‘relatively stable patterns of brain and bodily
(including behavioral and expressive) processes.’’ (Colombetti,
2014, p. 48).
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The role of past experience in orienting an organism to what
is relevant looks very different when viewed from the perspective
of the whole living animal in interaction with its environment.
Constructionists describe the psychological process of situated
conceptualization as involving the reenactment of past
experiences, which leads to an understanding of the cause
of one’s current bodily state of core affect, and creates ‘‘a
meaningful mental moment in the present’’ (Barrett and Satpute,
2013, p. 367). Emotion is responsible for giving an organism
a meaningful experience of the environment just as we argue,
but it does so only with the mediation of processes of situated
conceptualization. We’ve suggested by contrast that affect
in the form of action readiness orients the organism to the
possibilities for action that matter most to the organism at the
time. The organism finds itself ready to deal adequately with
the affordances of the environment, but it does so in large part
because of its past experience.
Particularly important are the skills and abilities built
up over long period of repeatedly encountering and dealing
with the same or similar situations. In sports and music
for instance ‘‘training, repetition and drill is the concrete
foundations on which the structure of play gets erected (Noë,
2009, p. 118). However it is not only in these socio-cultural
domains that practice matters; an animal’s adequate dealings
with the affordances of the environment is always a matter
of skill. An animal can respond to an affordance well or
badly, and it can get better over time at doing so (Rietveld,
2008). This past history of recurrent interactions with the
environment is necessary we suggest for correctly anticipating
the outcomes of one’s current interactions with the environment.
Past experience thus explains how the animal is currently
ready to respond adequately to relevant possibilities for action.
It is on the basis of this action readiness (which we have
just argued enfolds the organism’s past experiences) that the
organism gives meaning to the environment, and certain
possibilities for action stand out as immediately relevant to
the organism now. We therefore agree with constructionists
that past experience plays an important role in creating a
meaningful moment of emotional experience. We disagree
however about the form this meaningful moment of experience
takes. We argue it takes the form of the whole organism being
ready to deal adequately with the relevant affordances of its
environment.
This in turn suggests a different interpretation of the
constructionist finding that the grouping of areas that makes
up the DMN are consistently active for a range of different
emotional experiences. We speculate that the spontaneous
activity found in this population of neurons gives the organism
the ability to accurately and precisely anticipate the outcome of
its interactions with the environment. (For more details on how
we would understand these anticipatory processes we direct you
to Bruineberg and Rietveld (2014)).
Conclusion
Our goals in this paper have been twofold. First we wished to
show that cognitive neuroscience may need a different account of
cognitive function to that which cognitive psychology supplies.
Second we wanted to show that ecological psychology and
dynamical systems theory under the heading of radical embodied
cognitive science may be able to provide such an account of
cognitive function. However if we do look to embodied cognitive
science to play this role, this means giving up on a brain-centerd
view of cognitive function.We will no longer be able to claim that
the brain is the organ of the mind. Instead we will need to think
about mind and the cognitive processes that make up the mind
at the level of the whole brain-body-environment system. Let us
briefly recap our argument.
We began by reviewing some of the problems cognitive
neuroscientists have run into in mapping emotional and
cognitive functions onto discrete and separate structures in the
brain. Instead of discrete brain regions and networks performing
specialized emotional or cognitive computational operations, we
have discussed evidence that points to extensive mutual influence
between classical emotional and cognitive areas of the brain. We
then argued that this makes trouble for any attempt to localize
function in specific brain areas. We turned our attention next
to dimensional or constructivist theories of emotion that share
our view that the different emotions as they are understood
in common-sense psychology are unlikely to map onto distinct
neural circuits. Constructionists argue instead for an account
of the different emotions as constructed out of the activity and
interaction among domain-general neural networks. However
we argued that constructionists may face a similar problem to
the discrete emotion theorists they oppose. They may find that
the domain-general networks to which they appeal likewise do
not have fixed and permanent functions, but may shift their
functions in ways that depend on context.
The moral we think of this considerations about brain regions
and networks not having fixed and permanent functions is that
we need to think of cognitive function in the brain as context-
sensitive. We then turned our attention to offering an account of
this context-sensitivity. We argued for a view of affect as states
of action readiness involving the whole body of the organism.
States of action readiness manifest in the body as forms of arousal
that are either positively or negatively valued. These bodily states
prepare the organism to respond to relevant opportunities and
challenges in the environment. These states of action readiness
are tracked by interoceptive processes in the brain. The salience
network very likely plays a central role in this process (Menon
and Uddin, 2010). We then argued that patterns of large scale
activity take shape in the brain in ways that are driven by
the states of action readiness in the body as a whole. These
states of action readiness are elicited by relevant affordances in
the environment, and make the organism ready to respond to
relevant affordances.
So far our arguments have focused entirely on emotion and
how best to understand emotion in the brain. We take our
argument however to point to the more general conclusion that
cognitive function is best investigated at the level of the whole
brain-body-environment system. We take such a conclusion
to follow from what we’ve already argued about emotion and
cognition interactions in the brain. We’ve seen above that there
any separation of emotional and cognitive processes in the brain
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doesn’t hold up in reality. The brain areas that neuroimaging
studies identify as being active when people perform tasks that
engage emotional and cognitive processes turn out to be in
constant and continuous interaction. We’ve also argued that
emotional processes take place in the living body of the organism
in its interactions with an environment rich with affordances.
Given that there is no separating emotion and cognition it
follows that cognitive functions likewise deeply depend on the
whole living body of the organism in its engagement with an
environment rich with affordances.
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